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Cognitive closure (philosophy)
In philosophy of science and philosophy of mind, cognitive closure is the proposition that human minds are constitutionally incapable of solving certain perennial philosophical problems. Owen Flanagan calls this position ''anti-constructive naturalism'' or the ''new mysterianism'' and the primary advocate of the hypothesis, Colin McGinn,〔.〕 calls it ''transcendental naturalism'' because it acknowledges the possibility that solutions might fall within the grasp of an intelligent non-human of some kind. According to McGinn, such philosophical questions include the mind-body problem, identity of the self, foundations of meaning, free will, and knowledge, both ''a priori'' and empirical.
==Colin McGinn==
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